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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This matter comes before this court on an appeal from an 
order granting a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
 
Petitioner Francisco Rios filed his petition under 28 U.S.C. 
S 2241 against respondent Ron Wiley, the warden of the 
 
Federal Prison Camp at Allenwood, Pennsylvania ("FPC- 
 
Allenwood").1 The sole issue on appeal is whether the 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
1. Rios was incarcerated at FPC Allenwood at the time the court decided 
 
this case. He originally filed the petition in the Northern District of 
New 
 
York, but because of his place of incarceration the court transferred the 
 
petition to the Middle District of Pennsylvania. 
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district court erroneously determined that Rios was entitled 
 
to credit on his federal sentence for a period of 22 months 
 
that he was in federal detention pursuant to a writ of 
 
habeas corpus ad prosequendum prior to the imposition of 
 
his federal sentence for narcotics violations. We will affirm 
 
the order of the district court granting Rios's habeas corpus 
 
petition and thus allowing him the relief he seeks, but we 
 
reach our result on different grounds than those on which 
 
the district court relied. 
 
 
 
II. FACTS and PROCEEDINGS 
 
 
 
State authorities arrested Rios on or about August 6, 
 
1991, in New York and charged him with possession of 
 
cocaine. He was found guilty of the state charges and on 
 
November 7, 1991, the state court sentenced him tofive to 
 
ten years imprisonment. On November 6, 1991, a federal 
 
grand jury in the Southern District of New York indicted 
 
him for narcotics offenses unrelated to the state charges.2 
 
On November 21, 1991, federal authorities, pursuant to a 
 
writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, took custody of 
 
Rios for one day. On March 20, 1992, the federal 
 
authorities, pursuant to a second writ of habeas corpus ad 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
While the named respondent in this matter is Ron Wiley, the warden 
 
at FPC-Allenwood, the parties refer throughout their submissions to the 
 
appellant as the Bureau of Prisons because the appeal involves a 
 
sentencing calculation matter. We will adopt that designation of the 
 
appellant for ease of reference. 
 
 
 
2. In the district court's second opinion in this case, it indicated that 
the 
 
charges were unrelated, see Rios v. Wiley, 34 F. Supp.2d 265, 267 (M.D. 
 
Pa. 1999), and the Bureau of Prisons has taken the same position. Rios 
 
asserts, however, that they were related. We do not resolve that point on 
 this appeal. Moreover, there is conflicting evidence concerning the exact 
 
date of Rios's arrest on the state charges. The Presentence Report ("PSR") 
 
indicates that New York authorities arrested him on February 13, 1991, 
 
but the declaration of Charles McIntyre, the inmate systems manager at 
 
FPC-Allenwood, states the arrest date as August 6, 1991. The parties do 
 
not explain the inconsistency, but it is not material to the disposition 
of 
 
the appeal. Finally, we note that while the court indicated that Rios was 
 
indicted on November 6, 1991, the BOP indicates that the indictment 
 
was one day earlier. 
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prosequendum, took custody of Rios again for a period 
 
which proved to be extended and included the 22 months 
 
at issue. 
 
 
 
At a trial on the federal charges, the jury found Rios 
 
guilty on June 17, 1992, of conspiracy to distribute heroin 
 
and cocaine and distribution of and possession of heroin 
 
with intent to distribute. The court scheduled sentencing 
 
for September 15, 1992, but it was delayed until January 
 
31, 1994. Prior to the sentencing hearing the government 
 
sent a letter dated January 31, 1994, to the court 
 
discussing the application of U.S.S.G. S 5G1.3(c), p.s.3 to 
 
Rios's case. We will refer to that provision simply as 
 
"section 5G1.3(c)." In its opening remarks at the sentencing 
 
hearing, the court acknowledged receipt of the letter and 
 
stated that its contents were "duly noted." 
 
 
 
In the colloquy between counsel and the court during the 
 
sentencing hearing, Rios's attorney asked the court to 
 
consider, among other things, the fact that Rios had been 
 
in federal custody pursuant to the second writ since March 
 
1992. Specifically, he asked the court to "sentence Rios to 
 
the minimum guideline applicable which is 84 months, and 
 
to have that run concurrent with the time he is serving on 
 
the state case." When the assistant United States attorney 
 
stated that the "state conduct was not counted in 
 
calculating the offense level in this case," Rios's attorney 
 
interjected that he did not mean to imply that it had been. 
 
Immediately thereafter, the court asked the government 
 
attorney whether Rios, if given credit for time served, would 
 
receive credit back to March 1992, the time of the execution 
 
of the second writ by the federal authorities. The 
 
government attorney answered that crediting was a 
 
technical matter, and that he could not respond to the 
 
question at that time. The court replied that the answer 
 
was not material and it proceeded to sentence Rios. 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
3. "Section 5G1.3(c) is labeled a `Policy Statement'; we note that `[t]he 
 
policy statements and commentary contained in the guidelines are 
 
binding on the federal courts.' " United States v. Brannan, 74 F.3d 448, 
 
454 n.7 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Holifield, 53 F.3d 11, 13 
 
n.2 (3d Cir. 1995)). 
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The sentencing court sentenced Rios "to a term of 90 
 
months on both counts to run concurrently with each other 
 
and concurrently with the state sentence and that you 
 
receive credit for time served." The court, however, did not 
 
indicate what period of "time served" should be applied to 
 
the federal sentence. Moreover, the judgment entered 
 
merely recited: "Defendant to receive credit for time served." 
 
The government did not seek clarification or modification of 
 
the sentence, nor did it appeal from it. 
 
 
 
The federal authorities returned Rios to New York state 
 
custody on February 18, 1994. Thus, it is undisputed that 
 
Rios remained in the control of the federal authorities from 
 
the time of the execution of the second writ on March 20, 
 
1992, until February 18, 1994. It is also undisputed that 
 
he previously had been sentenced in state court on 
 
November 7, 1991, and that he was serving his state 
 
sentence while in the federal custody pursuant to the 
 
second writ. 
 
 
 
Shortly after the federal authorities returned Rios to state 
 
custody, the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") designated the New 
 
York State Department of Correctional Services for service 
 
of his federal sentence. It made this designation nunc pro 
 
tunc as of January 31, 1994, the date of the federal 
 
sentencing. By specifying the federal sentence to have 
 
commenced on January 31, 1994, the BOP did not credit 
 
Rios for the 22-month time period he spent under federal 
 
control pursuant to the second writ before January 31, 
 
1994, despite the sentencing court's statement at the 
 
sentencing and its direction in the judgment of conviction 
 
and sentence that credit be awarded for "time served." 
 
 
 
New York released Rios on parole from his state sentence 
 
on August 2, 1996, and the BOP received Rios for service 
 
of the remainder of his federal sentence. Upon his transfer 
 
to federal custody, Rios learned that the BOP had not 
 
credited the time between March 20, 1992, the date he was 
 
detained by federal authorities by virtue of the second writ, 
 
and January 31, 1994, the date of his federal sentencing. 
 
Rios filed an administrative remedy request at his place of 
 
incarceration at the time, the Federal Corrections 
 
Institution at Ray Brook, New York ("FCI Ray Brook"), 
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challenging the BOP's failure to credit that 22-month period 
 
against his federal sentence. 
 
 
 
Warden W.S. Keller of FCI Ray Brook denied Rios's 
 
request on November 25, 1996. Rios exhausted his 
 
administrative remedies and subsequently filed his habeas 
 
corpus petition. The petition reiterated Rios's challenge of 
 
the BOP's refusal to credit his federal sentence for time 
 
served while in federal detention pursuant to the second 
 
writ. At the time Rios filed his habeas corpus petition, 
 
applying the BOP's crediting calculations, his projected 
 
release date was August 12, 2000.4 Rios contended that his 
 
release date should have been September 30, 1998. 
 
 
 
The district court granted Rios's habeas corpus petition 
 
in a memorandum and order entered December 9, 1998. 
 
See Rios v. Wiley, 29 F. Supp.2d 232 (M.D. Pa. 1998) ("Rios 
 
I"). While the district court believed that the literal language 
 
of 18 U.S.C. S 3585(b), which we will call simply "section 
 
3585(b)," appeared to preclude granting the credit Rios 
 
sought, it nevertheless concluded that he was entitled to 
 
credit on his federal sentence for the 22-month period that 
 
he remained in federal control under the second writ to 
 
"effectuate[ ] the intent of the federal sentencing court." Rios 
 
I, 29 F. Supp.2d at 236. The district court relied on the 
 
reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in 
 
United States v. Benefield, 942 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1991), in 
 
support of its result. See Rios I, 29 F. Supp.2d at 234. 
 
Consequently, the court ordered the BOP to recalculate 
 
Rios's release date, and stated that if the new calculation 
 
entitled him to immediate release, he was to be released. 
 
 
 
The BOP subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration, 
 
which the district court denied by memorandum and order 
 
entered February 3, 1999. See Rios v. Wiley, 34 F. Supp.2d 
 
265 (M.D. Pa. 1999) ("Rios II"). Upon reconsideration, the 
 
court retreated from its prior position that Benefield 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
4. We note that the district court originally stated that the projected 
 
release date was February 12, 2000, see Rios v. Wiley, 29 F. Supp.2d 
 
232, 233 (M.D. Pa. 1998), but in a second opinion it issued on the BOP's 
 
motion for reconsideration, it indicated the date was August 12, 2000. 
 
See Rios v. Wiley, 34 F. Supp.2d at 266. We are satisfied that the second 
 
date is correct. See app. at 75. 
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provided the applicable rule of law in this case. Instead, the 
 
district court granted the petition based on the reasoning of 
 
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Brown v. 
 
Perrill ("Brown II"), 28 F.3d 1073 (10th Cir. 1994), 
 
supplementing and clarifying Brown v. Perrill ("Brown I"), 
 
21 F.3d 1008 (10th Cir. 1994). In Brown, a case that 
 
involved facts that the district court regarded as"materially 
 
identical" to those here, see Rios II, 34 F. Supp.2d at 270, 
 
the court held that the lengthy period the prisoner spent in 
 
custody on the writ transmuted the period into federal 
 
custody. See Brown II, 28 F.3d at 1075. Because it was 
 
undisputed that if the 22-month period was applied on the 
 
federal sentence, Rios was entitled to immediate release, 
 
the court ordered his release from federal custody. 
 
 
 
The BOP filed a timely notice of appeal. While the notice 
 
of appeal recites that it is from the February 3, 1999 order, 
 
effectively the appeal is from the order granting the habeas 
 
corpus petition as well and we are deciding the case on that 
 
basis. 
 
 
 
III. JURISDICTION and STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 
 
 
The district court exercised jurisdiction over this matter 
 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. SS 1331 and 2241. We have 
 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.SS 1291 
 
and 2253(a), as the BOP filed a timely notice of appeal from 
 
the final judgment of the district court entered February 3, 
 
1999.5 
 
 
 
In a federal habeas corpus proceeding, we exercise 
 
plenary review over the district court's legal conclusions 
 
and apply a clearly erroneous standard to the court's 
 
factual findings. See Lambert v. Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 
 
512 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Caswell v. Ryan, 953 F.2d 853, 
 
857 (3d Cir. 1992) (citing Bond v. Fulcomer, 864 F.2d 306, 
 
309 (3d Cir. 1989))); see also United States v. Dorsey, 166 
 
F.3d 558, 560 (3d Cir. 1999) ("Our review of the district 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
5. Because the government has taken the appeal in this proceeding, a 
 
certificate of appealability is not required as a prerequisite to our 
 
exercise of appellate jurisdiction. See Fed. R. App. P. 22; Lambert v. 
 
Blackwell, 134 F.3d 506, 512 n.15 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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court's interpretation of S 3585(b) and the[sentencing] 
 
guidelines is plenary."); Barden v. Keohane, 921 F.2d 476, 
 
479 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating that court of appeals exercises 
 
plenary review over district court's legal conclusions which 
 
formed the basis of the lower court's denial of the habeas 
 
corpus petition). In this case, however, the issues are 
 
essentially legal in nature and thus we exercise plenary 
 
review. 
 
 
 
IV. DISCUSSION 
 
 
 
A. 
 
 
 
The BOP argues that the district court erred in granting 
 
Rios's habeas corpus petition, as it failed to recognize that 
 
the general principles governing the computation of a 
 
federal sentence prohibit an inmate from receiving credit on 
 
a federal sentence for pre-sentence detention where the 
 
same time was credited against a previously imposed state 
 
sentence. Br. at 13-17. In particular, the BOP points to 
 
section 3585(b) as the governing statute in this appeal, and 
 
contends that its plain language states that a defendant 
 
may receive credit for prior custody "that has not been 
 
credited against another sentence." Id. at 17. 
 
 
 
This appeal requires us to explore once again the 
 
interplay between the roles of the sentencing court in 
 
determining the length of a sentence of incarceration to be 
 
served and the BOP in calculating when the sentence 
 
imposed will have been satisfied. See, e.g. , Dorsey, 166 
 
F.3d at 561-63 (interpreting sentencing court's power to 
 
award concurrent sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 5G1.3(b) 
 
and Application Note 2 as not conflicting with BOP's 
 
authority under section 3585(b) to award prior custody 
 
credit). The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (the"Act"), 18 
 
U.S.C. S 3551 et seq., 28 U.S.C. S 991-998, along with the 
 
Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G." or "guidelines") 
 
promulgated pursuant to the Act, contain several provisions 
 
relevant to our resolution of the issue presented by this 
 
appeal. 
 
 
 
We will begin our analysis by setting forth the relevant 
 
statutory provisions and guidelines governing the 
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sentencing court's determination of the length of the 
 
sentence to be imposed where the defendant is subject to 
 
an undischarged term of imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. S 3584 
 
states in pertinent part: 
 
 
 
Multiple sentences of imprisonment. 
 
 
 
(a) Imposition of concurrent or consecutive terms.--If 
 
multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed on a 
 
defendant at the same time, or if a term of 
 
imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is 
 
already subject to an undischarged term of 
 
imprisonment, the terms may run concurrently or 
 
consecutively, except that the terms may not run 
 
consecutively for an attempt and for another offense 
 
that was the sole objective of the attempt. Multiple 
 
terms of imprisonment imposed at the same time run 
 
concurrently unless the court orders or the statute 
 
mandates that the terms are to run consecutively. 
 
Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different 
 
times run consecutively unless the court orders that 
 
the terms are to run concurrently. 
 
 
 
(b) Factors to be considered in imposing concurren t or 
 
consecutive terms.--The court, in determining whether 
 
the terms imposed are to be ordered to run 
 
concurrently or consecutively, shall consider, as to 
 
each offense for which a term of imprisonment is being 
 
imposed, the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.S ] 3553(a). 
 
 
 
Id. While section 3584 enables the sentencing court to 
 
award a concurrent sentence, that discretion is subject to 
 
the applicable guidelines section, namely U.S.S.G.S 5G1.3. 
 
See Dorsey, 166 F.3d at 561-62; United States v. Holifield, 
 
53 F.3d 11, 13 (3d Cir. 1995); see also 28 U.S.C. 
 
S 994(a)(1)(D) (imposing statutory duty upon Sentencing 
 
Commission to include in guidelines "a determination 
 
whether multiple sentences to terms of imprisonment 
 
should be ordered to run concurrently or consecutively"). 
 
 
 
The version of U.S.S.G. S 5G1.3 in effect at the time of 
 
Rios's sentencing on January 31, 1994, contains three 
 
subsections. See U.S.S.G. S 5G1.3 (Nov. 1993).6 Subsection 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
6. We will apply the version of section 5G1.3(c) and Application Note 3 in 
 
effect on the date of Rios's sentencing. See U.S.S.G. S 1B1.11; Brannan, 
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(a) of the guideline describes circumstances in which 
 
imposition of a consecutive sentence is mandatory: 
 
 
 
If the instant offense was committed while the 
 
defendant was serving a term of imprisonment 
 
(including work release, furlough, or escape status) or 
 
after sentencing for, but before commencing service of, 
 
such term of imprisonment, the sentence for the 
 
instant offense shall be imposed to run consecutively 
 
to the undischarged term of imprisonment. 
 
 
 
U.S.S.G. S 5G1.3(a). Subsection (b) provides the 
 
circumstances in which a concurrent sentence is 
 
mandatory: 
 
 
 
If subsection (a) does not apply, and the undischarged 
 
term of imprisonment resulted from offense(s) that 
 
have been fully taken into account in the 
 
determination of the offense level for the instant 
 
offense, the sentence for the instant offense shall be 
 
imposed to run concurrently to the undischarged term 
 
of imprisonment. 
 
 
 
U.S.S.G. S 5G1.3(b). For cases in which neither (a) nor (b) 
 
applies, the Sentencing Commission has issued section 
 
5G1.3(c), which is a policy statement to guide the courts: 
 
 
 
(Policy Statement) In any other case, the sentence for 
 
the instant offense shall be imposed to run 
 
consecutively to the prior undischarged term of 
 
imprisonment to the extent necessary to achieve a 
 
reasonable incremental punishment for the instant 
 
offense. 
 
 
 
See also United States v. Brannan, 74 F.3d 448, 454 n.7 
 
(3d Cir. 1996). 
 
 
 
The Act also addressed the related but distinct issue of 
 
the award of credit on a federal sentence for pre-sentence 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
74 F.3d at 450 n.2 (noting that court should apply guideline provision in 
 
effect at the time of sentencing unless the court determines that to do so 
 
would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution 
 
in that it would yield a harsher result than that in effect at the time of 
 
the offense). 
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incarceration. Pursuant to the Act, Congress rewrote 18 
 
U.S.C. S 3568 ("section 3568"), the prior statute governing 
 
the award of credit for pre-federal sentence incarceration, 
 
and recodified it as section 3585(b). Section 3585(b) 
 
(emphasis added) provides in relevant part: 
 
 
 
Calculation of a term of imprisonment 
 
 
 
(b) Credit for prior custody.--A defendant shall be 
 
given credit toward the service of a term of 
 
imprisonment for any time he has spent in official 
 
detention prior to the date the sentence commences-- 
 
 
 
(1) as a result of the offense for which the sente nce 
 
was imposed; or 
 
 
 
(2) as a result of any other charge for which the 
 
defendant was arrested after the commission of the 
 
offense for which the sentence was imposed; 
 
 
 
that has not been credited against another sentence. 
 
 
 
As the district court and the parties have framed the 
 
legal issue presented in this case, the controversy concerns 
 
the correct interpretation of the last clause of section 
 
3585(b) and its application to the 22-month period of Rios's 
 
detention by federal authorities pursuant to the second 
 
writ. We do not view the issue that narrowly. Rather, in 
 
exercising plenary review of the issues of law Rios's petition 
 
raised under 28 U.S.C. S 2241, we find that the appropriate 
 
starting point is to ascertain the meaning that we should 
 
ascribe to the sentencing court's directives that the federal 
 
and state sentences be served concurrently and that Rios 
 
be given credit for time served. Indeed, it is apparent to us 
 
that the district court's disposition of the matter as though 
 
governed by section 3585(b) overlooked the possibility that 
 
the sentencing court's directives related to its power to 
 
impose a sentence in accordance with the applicable 
 
guidelines provision, section 5G1.3(c) that we quoted above.7 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
7. There can be no dispute that sections 5G1.3(a) and (b) do not apply 
 
to this case. We repeat that section 5G1.3(a) sets forth the situations in 
 
which a consecutive sentence is mandatory, and the BOP does not 
 
contend on appeal that that provision applies. Moreover, the government 
 
and Rios's attorney at the time of the sentencing believed that section 
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We reiterate that section 5G1.3(c) provides that the 
 
federal sentence should "be imposed to run consecutively to 
 
the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to the extent 
 
necessary to achieve a reasonable incremental punishment 
 
for the crime." Application Note 3 sets forth a methodology 
 
for the court to follow in determining what amounts to a 
 
"reasonable incremental punishment" for the crime. It 
 
provides that: 
 
 
 
To the extent practicable, the court should consider a 
 
reasonable incremental penalty to be a sentence for the 
 
instant offense that results in a combined sentence of 
 
imprisonment that approximates the total punishment 
 
that would have been imposed under S 5G1.2 
 
(Sentencing on Multiple Counts of Conviction) had all 
 
of the offenses been federal offenses for which 
 
sentences were being imposed at the same time. 
 
 
 
Section 5G1.3(c) comment. (n.3). This methodology"is 
 
meant to assist the court in determining the appropriate 
 
sentence (e.g., the appropriate point within the applicable 
 
guideline range, whether to order the sentence to run 
 
concurrently or consecutively to the undischarged term of 
 
imprisonment, or whether a departure is warranted)." Id. 
 
comment. (n.3). Once the court applies the methodology set 
 
forth in Application Note 3 and approaches the sentencing 
 
as if sentences on both offenses were being imposed at 
 
once, the court must determine what incremental 
 
punishment is appropriate in view of the sentence that 
 
would have resulted under U.S.S.G. S 5G1.2. See Brannan, 
 
74 F.3d at 454-55.8 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
5G1.3(b) did not apply, as the conduct involved in the state charge was 
 
not considered "relevant conduct" for purposes of determining Rios's 
 
federal offense level. App. at 46-47; see United States v. Oser, 107 F.3d 
 
1080, 1085 (3d Cir. 1997). Thus, section 5G1.3(c) provides the 
 
applicable guidelines provision in the circumstances here. Id. at 1086 
 
("Inasmuch as we conclude that subsection (b) does not apply . . . it 
 
follows that subsection (c) is the relevant guideline provision for 
 
determining whether [the defendant's] sentence should be imposed 
 
concurrently or consecutively."). 
 
 
 
8. We understand section 5G1.3(c) to permit a district court to exercise 
 
its discretion and award a concurrent sentence in a manner that would 
 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
Upon inspection of the sentencing transcript as well as 
 
the judgment the sentencing court entered on January 31, 
 
1994, we are convinced that the sentencing court applied 
 
section 5G1.3(c) in its form as of the date of Rios's 
 
sentencing to impose a reduced federal sentence that, in its 
 
view, achieved "a reasonable incremental punishment" for 
 
the federal narcotics offenses, given the circumstance that 
 
Rios already had served 22 months on an unrelated state 
 
conviction at a time that he was in federal custody. See 
 
section 5G1.3(c). In other words, we understand the 
 
sentencing court to have exercised its discretion to impose 
 
a federal sentence under section 5G1.3(c) which took into 
 
consideration the 22 months that Rios had spent in federal 
 
custody as of the date of the federal sentencing proceeding, 
 
January 31, 1994, so that the actual sentence imposed was 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
ensure that the federal sentence, while imposed at a later time, took into 
 
account prior time served on an unrelated state sentence. See Brannan, 
 
74 F.3d at 455 (stating that district court could have departed from 
 
guidelines range and awarded sentence that took into account prior time 
 
served on state sentence); United States v. Hill , 59 F.3d 500, 503 (4th 
 
Cir. 1995) (same); see also United States v. Goudy, 78 F.3d 309, 314 n.4 
 
(7th Cir. 1996) (citing U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 535). In Brannan, we 
 
explained the mechanics of applying the methodology set forth in 
 
Application Note 3 to achieve the result reached in this case. First, the 
 
court must determine hypothetically what the sentence for the federal 
 
and state offenses would have been if sentenced together under U.S.S.G. 
 
S 5G1.2. The court could conclude then that no incremental penalty was 
 
warranted and therefore a concurrent federal sentence was called for 
 
under the circumstances. To achieve that result, the court could depart 
 
from the guidelines range by taking into consideration the time served 
 
on the prior state sentence and subtracting that amount from the overall 
 
federal sentence imposed. Thus, the court would sentence the offender 
 
with a lower term of imprisonment to run concurrently with the 
 
remaining undischarged term, and consecutively thereafter (if the federal 
 
sentence imposed was longer than the state sentence would be even 
 
after the pre-federal sentence incarceration was considered). See 
 
Brannan, 74 F.3d at 455; Holifield, 50 F.3d at 14 n.5 ("Occasionally a 
 
downward departure may be necessary to make this provision work 
 
properly. For example, where the defendant has been in state custody for 
 
a long time, a downward departure may be the only feasible way to 
 
achieve an appropriate total punishment, assuming the court wishes to 
 
employ a departure to achieve the desired objective."); Hill, 59 F.3d at 
 
503. 
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90 months, less 22 months, or 68 months total. The 
 
sentencing court also indicated that the sentence imposed 
 
was to run concurrently with the state sentence, with the 
 
balance, if any, of the federal sentence to be served 
 
thereafter. From that initial conclusion, we hold that the 
 
BOP was required to effectuate the sentence imposed by the 
 
sentencing court, and consequently that Rios is entitled to 
 
relief under 28 U.S.C. S 2241 so that his sentence reflects 
 
an adjustment for the 22-month period in issue. 
 
 
 
A review of the result produced in this case by the use of 
 
the methodology set forth in Application Note 3 supports 
 
our conclusion that the sentencing court applied section 
 
5G1.3(c) in imposing the period of imprisonment on the 
 
federal conviction. First, the court would have considered 
 
the guideline range for the federal offenses and the 
 
guideline range that would have resulted if the sentences 
 
for the state and federal offenses were being imposed at the 
 
same time in the same federal sentencing proceeding. Here, 
 
as the government's January 31, 1994 letter to the 
 
sentencing court indicates, Rios's actual offense level was 
 
18, and the combined offense level would have been 18 had 
 
the state conduct been considered part of the federal 
 
offense conduct. Thus, because of the small quantity of 
 
narcotics involved in the state offense, consideration of that 
 
quantity in the hypothetical federal sentencing under 
 
U.S.S.G. S 5G1.2 would not have changed the offense level. 
 
App. at 79; see also U.S.S.G. SS 5G1.2; 2D1.1(a)(3), (c)(13); 
 
3D1.1; 3D1.2; 3D1.3; 3D1.4. Accordingly, the sentencing 
 
court was faced with a rather anomalous situation because 
 
if the hypothetical sentencing had been the real sentencing, 
 
the guideline range, 84 to 105 months, insofar as it was 
 
dependent on the quantity of narcotics involved, would 
 
have been the same as the actual range used by the 
 
sentencing court. See U.S.S.G. Sentencing Table, Level 22, 
 
Category VI; app. at 53.9 
 
 
 
Therefore, if the sentences on the federal and state 
 
offenses had been imposed at the same time and in the 
 
same proceeding, absent a departure Rios would have been 
 
subject to a combined sentence within the same guidelines 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
9. By reason of adjustments Rios's total offense level was 22. 
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range as was actually applicable at the sentencing. In that 
 
event, if punishment for the state and federal offenses had 
 
been imposed as one sentence in the same federal 
 
sentencing proceeding, Rios could have received the same 
 
period of incarceration, and obviously that single sentence 
 
would have commenced as of the date of sentencing (or at 
 
least as of the date that the BOP transported Rios to a 
 
federal institution to commence service of his sentence). 
 
 
 
In other words, if a single sentence for the two offenses 
 
had been imposed at the same time and in the same federal 
 
sentencing proceeding, there would have been no need to 
 
consider whether to award "credit," as the sentencing court 
 
used that term, because Rios would not have been serving 
 
an undischarged term of imprisonment as of the date of the 
 
federal sentencing proceeding. Inasmuch as Application 
 
Note 3 specifically states that the methodology is"meant to 
 
assist the court in determining the appropriate sentence," 
 
from a review of all the circumstances of the case we have 
 
reached the conclusion that the sentencing court viewed 
 
Rios's particular history as requiring an adjustment of the 
 
federal sentence to account for the disparity caused by the 
 
timing of the imposition of two separate sentences. See 
 
Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 405, 115 S.Ct. 2199, 
 
2208-09 (1995) ("[Section] 5G1.3 operates to mitigate the 
 
possibility that the fortuity of two separate prosecutions will 
 
grossly increase a defendant's sentence."); Dorsey, 166 F.3d 
 
at 562 (" `In general, S 5G1.3 is intended to result in a 
 
federal sentence that most nearly approximates the 
 
sentence that would have been imposed had all the 
 
sentences been imposed at the same time.' ") (quoting 
 
United States v. Kiefer, 20 F.3d 874, 875-76 (8th Cir. 1994)) 
 
(quoting section 5G1.3, comment. (backg'd.)); Holifield, 50 
 
F.3d at 15 ("It is important to note the methodology of 
 
S 5G1.3 vests discretion in the trial judge. .. . [A] downward 
 
departure may be desirable when the increase is simply 
 
because of a delay in the defendant's trial or sentencing."). 
 
 
 
We believe that the sentencing court intended to correct 
 
the disparity that resulted from the happenstance of the 
 
dates of the federal and state sentencing proceedings by 
 
sentencing Rios to 90 months, less 22 months, to reach an 
 
adjusted sentence of 68 months, which would then be 
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served concurrently with the remainder of the state 
 
sentence. Indeed, it appears to us that the sentencing court 
 
expressed its intention to depart from the guideline range, 
 
84 to 105 months, and award the 22-month reduction in 
 
the federal sentence by indicating that Rios was to receive 
 
"credit for time served." 
 
 
 
We note that the colloquy between the court and counsel 
 
at sentencing confirms our understanding of the sentencing 
 
court's intention in using the words "credit for time served" 
 
in conjunction with the statement of the term of 
 
imprisonment as "90 months." Specifically, Rios's attorney 
 
pointed out that he had "suffered to a tremendous degree" 
 
by virtue of the time he already had spent incarcerated and 
 
asked the court to "consider that in determining his 
 
sentence." App. at 44-45. Almost immediately after these 
 
statements, the court asked the government about the time 
 
that Rios spent in pre-sentence detention. The following 
 
exchange occurred: 
 
 
 
THE COURT: So that if Mr. Rios is given credit for time 
 
served he would get credit from March `92 to date? 
 
 
 
MR. CLEVELAND: That is a technical matter that I may 
 
not be able to offer guidance on, as to how the 
 
crediting is done. I can make an inquiry if it would be 
 
helpful. 
 
 
 
THE COURT: It won't be material. I just thought-- 
 
 
 
App. at 47. At this point, the court pronounced its sentence 
 
of 90 months on both federal counts to run concurrently 
 
with each other and concurrently with the state sentence, 
 
and ordered that Rios receive "credit for time served." App. 
 
at 47-48. 
 
 
 
The juxtaposition of the actual words used in 
 
pronouncing the sentence and the discussion between the 
 
attorneys on the one hand and the court on the other 
 
demonstrates that the sentencing court was cognizant of 
 
the time Rios had spent in pre-sentence incarceration, and 
 
further that Rios sought consideration for that time from 
 
the court in its determination of the sentence to be 
 
imposed. Thus, the sentencing court had before it sufficient 
 
information upon which it could have concluded that 
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section 5G1.3(c) applied and permitted it to impose the 
 
sentence that it did. 
 
 
 
Moreover, inasmuch as the sentencing court "duly noted" 
 
the contents of the government's January 31, 1994 letter 
 
during the sentencing hearing, app. at 43, it cannot be 
 
disputed that the court was aware of the applicability of 
 
section 5G1.3(c). Indeed, the government's letter contained 
 
its calculation of the combined offense level for the total 
 
amount of narcotics involved in the state and federal 
 
offenses, which is a significant aspect of the calculation 
 
required by the methodology prescribed in Application Note 
 
3 to section 5G1.3(c). See section 5G1.3(c) comment. (n.3) 
 
(directing the court to calculate hypothetical sentence as if 
 
it were sentencing under U.S.S.G. S 5G1.2; section 5G1.2 
 
then directs court to calculate combined sentence under 
 
Chapter 3, Part D and Part C of Chapter 5). 
 
 
 
We reach our conclusion concerning the meaning of the 
 
sentencing court's words used to describe the components 
 
of its sentence despite the fact that it did not cite expressly 
 
section 5G1.3(c) or Application Note 3 at the sentencing 
 
hearing. After all, the Court of Appeals for the Second 
 
Circuit has held that a district court need not refer 
 
explicitly to section 5G1.3(c) in sentencing a defendant, 
 
provided that the circumstances indicate that the court 
 
considered "the basic principle that a consecutive sentence 
 
should be imposed to the extent that it will result in a 
 
reasonable incremental penalty." See United States v. 
 
Margiotti, 85 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Section 
 
5G1.3(c) simply does not require the use of any particular 
 
verbal formula or incantation.") (citing United States v. 
 
McCormick, 58 F.3d 874, 878 (2d Cir. 1995)); see also 
 
McCormick, 58 F.3d at 878 (affirming sentence where 
 
district court did not perform calculation under section 
 
5G1.3(c) on the record, but computation was before the 
 
court in the parties' written submissions); United States v. 
 
Lagatta, 50 F.3d 125, 128 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[T]he 
 
commentary [does not] require that the district court 
 
expressly demonstrate that it engaged in the multi-count 
 
analysis."). Without addressing whether the sentencing 
 
court should have expressed its intentions differently, it is 
 
apparent that the sentencing court used the language it 
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did, "concurrently" and "credit for time served," to indicate 
 
its exercise of discretion under section 5G1.3(c) and 
 
Application Note 3.10 
 
 
 
As the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit observed in 
 
similar circumstances, 
 
 
 
District judges normally deliver their decisions on 
 
sentencing from the bench, just after, and sometimes 
 
in the course of, the presentation of numerous 
 
arguments and even evidence as to the permissible 
 
range and proper sentence. These often spontaneous 
 
remarks are addressed primarily to the case at hand 
 
and are unlikely to be a perfect or complete statement 
 
of all of the surrounding law. What the district judge 
 
said here was entirely adequate as directed to the 
 
present case. 
 
 
 
United States v. Saldana, 109 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 
 
1997). Neither precedent nor logic dictates that Rios serve 
 
an additional 22 months on his federal sentence simply 
 
because the court did not state explicitly its reliance on 
 
section 5G1.3(c) and Application Note 3, given the overall 
 
context in which the court imposed the sentence and the 
 
information before the court at that time.11 
 
 
 
In reaching our conclusion, we have considered but 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
10. Again, we note that the government did not appeal from the 
 
sentence, nor did it seek its reconsideration or clarification. 
 
 
 
11. We held in Holifield that the district court must calculate the 
 
reasonable incremental punishment according to the methodology in 
 
Application Note 3 to section 5G1.3(c), but that the imposition of that 
 
penalty is within the court's discretion. See Holifield, 50 F.3d at 16. 
If, 
 
however, the district court imposes a different penalty or employs a 
 different method of calculating the penalty, it must indicate its reasons 
 
for not utilizing the methodology. Id. Our ruling in this case in no way 
 
is inconsistent with Holifield, as we are not confronted with a situation 
 
where we are considering on direct appeal a contention that the district 
 
court departed from section 5G1.3(c) and Application Note 3 without 
 
stating its reasons for doing so. Instead, our reading of the sentencing 
 
court's opinion is that it applied Application Note 3 to arrive at what it 
 
believed to be a reasonable incremental punishment for the federal 
 
offenses, without specifically citing section 5G1.3(c) or Application Note 
 
3 in rendering its sentence. 
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rejected the BOP's arguments on this point. It contends 
 
first that the sentencing court's reference to the award of 
 
"credit for time served" should be considered as nothing 
 
more than a direction or non-binding recommendation to 
 
the BOP to award pre-sentence credit that it deemed 
 
appropriate. Br. at 22-23; app. at 48, 51; see United States 
 
v. Pineyro, 112 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 1997) (order appealed 
 
from was only a non-binding recommendation that BOP not 
 
credit prisoner with time he spent in state custody, but 
 
recommendation was not contained in district court's 
 
judgment of conviction and sentence). Alternatively, the 
 
BOP asserts that the portion of the judgment directing that 
 
Rios receive credit for time served should be considered 
 "surplusage and ineffective" because it usurps the authority 
 
granted to the BOP to determine pre-sentence credit. Reply 
 
Br. at 7 n.2. 
 
 
 
As to the first contention, we believe that we must view 
 
the sentencing court's language in the context of the overall 
 
proceeding. Given the fact that the government raised the 
 
concept of a concurrent sentence in the January 31, 1994 
 
letter, and that Rios's attorney at the sentencing hearing 
 
did so as well, the court's reference to "credit for time 
 
served," while ambiguous, was not, as the government 
 
suggests, merely a non-binding direction or 
 
recommendation to the BOP to award credit under section 
 
3585(b) that the BOP deemed appropriate. We recognize 
 
that the term "credit" is used in Chapter 227 of Title 18 as 
 
a "term of art" to describe a potential benefit allowed a 
 
defendant by the BOP in its role as the agency charged with 
 
determining when the federal sentence imposed by the 
 
sentencing court is satisfied. See Dorsey, 166 F.3d at 564- 
 
65 (Stapleton, J., concurring). In this case, however, it 
 
appears that the sentencing court simply used that term of 
 
art slightly imprecisely, which, as the circumstances in 
 
Dorsey reveal, cannot be considered an unprecedented 
 
occurrence. See id. (Stapleton, J., concurring) ("I write 
 
separately to note that much of the conflict which the 
 
government perceives between S 3585(b) and Application 
 
Note 2 to U.S.S.G. S 5G1.3(b) is attributable to its use of the 
 word "credit" to refer to two distinct benefits that a 
 
convicted defendant may receive."). 
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It cannot be argued successfully that the use of the 
 
phrase "credit for time served" by the sentencing judge only 
 
can be interpreted to mean that the court directed the BOP 
 
to do what it is statutorily required to do, nor can it be 
 
viewed in this context as a non-binding recommendation. 
 
This is especially so in view of the fact that under the plain 
 
language of section 3585(b), which we will explore in 
 
greater detail below in Part B of this section, the BOP would 
 
not be required to award Rios with credit on his federal 
 
sentence for the 22-month period at issue. In these 
 
circumstances, if we adopted the BOP's interpretation, the 
 
sentencing court's direction or non-binding 
 
recommendation would have been of little significance or 
 
more likely would have been totally meaningless. 
 
 
 
We find equally without merit the BOP's alternative 
 
argument that we should disregard the sentencing court's 
 
provision for "credit for time served" as mere"surplusage 
 
and ineffective." Reply Br. at 7 n.2; app. at 51. The BOP 
 
premises its assertion in this regard on its belief that the 
 
sentencing court's use of that phrase was an attempt to 
 award sentencing credit under section 3585(b) in violation 
 
of the Supreme Court's holding in United States v. Wilson, 
 
503 U.S. 329, 112 S.Ct. 1351 (1992). There the Supreme 
 
Court held that the Attorney General (by way of delegation 
 
to the BOP) rather than the sentencing court has the 
 
authority to award credit to a federal prisoner for time 
 
served before federal sentencing pursuant to section 
 
3585(b). See id. at 334-35, 112 S.Ct. at 1354-55. 
 
 
 
The problem with the BOP's interpretation, however, is 
 
that it does not account for our alternative interpretation of 
 
the district court's imposition of a 90-month sentence in 
 
conjunction with its use of the phrase "credit for time 
 
served." As we explained above, the use of the two phrases 
 
in combination expresses the sentencing court's intention 
 
to impose an adjusted federal sentence under section 
 
5G1.3(c) that was to be served concurrently with the 
 
remainder of the unexpired state sentence. As is evident 
 
from our prior discussion, we find that the sentencing court 
 
interpreted section 5G1.3(c) and Application Note 3 as 
 
permitting it to impose such a sentence, and that the 
 
language it used effectuated the court's intent in that 
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regard. Thus, because the BOP's argument hinges on its 
 interpretation of the language as an award of credit under 
 
section 3585(b), rather than an application of section 
 
5G1.3(c) and Application Note 3, we reject its argument 
 
that the credit for time served language is "surplusage and 
 
ineffective." 
 
 
 
Moreover, the BOP's argument fails in light of our opinion 
 
in Dorsey which recognized that neither the enactment of 
 
section 3585(b) nor the Supreme Court's ruling in Wilson 
 
limited the sentencing court's authority to apply section 
 
5G1.3 and impose a concurrent sentence to the extent 
 
appropriate. See Dorsey, 166 F.3d at 561 (noting that 
 
Wilson did not apply because "it did not deal with the 
 
situation of a federal court exercising its discretion to 
 
impose a concurrent sentence and how to make that 
 
sentence truly concurrent to a sentence for a related 
 
offense, the subject of application note 2 [to U.S.S.G. 
 
S 5G1.3(b)]"); see also Kiefer, 20 F.3d at 876 ("[W]e find 
 
nothing in Wilson suggesting that the Attorney General's 
 
authority under S 3585(b) limits a sentencing court's power 
 
to apply S 5G1.3 of the Guidelines."). 
 
 
 
While Dorsey involved a challenge to the validity of 
 
Application Note 2 and section 5G1.3(b), the same rationale 
 
applies to the court's exercise of discretion to impose a 
 
concurrent sentence under section 5G1.3(c) and Application 
 
Note 3. To be sure, an application of section 5G1.3(b) or (c) 
 and the commentary by the sentencing court, and the 
 
award of sentencing credit by the BOP under section 
 
3585(b), may result in the same benefit to the defendant. 
 
Nevertheless, that the same outcome may be obtained 
 
either way does not alter the fact that the two benefits 
 
bestowed are distinct, and the Supreme Court's opinion in 
 
Wilson only meant to refer to the award of sentencing credit 
 
under section 3585(b) when it determined that the power to 
 
award that credit was entrusted exclusively to the BOP. See 
 
Dorsey, 166 F.3d at 564-65 (Stapleton, J., concurring) ("We 
 
agree with the Eighth and Ninth Circuits Courts of Appeal 
 
that the Supreme Court in Wilson was referring to the latter 
 
form of benefit [an award of sentencing credit under section 
 
3585(b)] when it held that only the [BOP] is authorized . . . 
 
to `give credit' against a previously imposed sentence."). 
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We therefore reject the BOP's argument that we should 
 
view the "credit for time served" portion of the judgment as 
 
"surplusage and ineffective" because the argument rests on 
 
the faulty premise that the sentencing court intended to 
 
award credit under section 3585(b). Because we have 
 
determined that the language "credit for time served" 
 
demonstrates the sentencing court's intention to fashion an 
 
appropriate sentence under section 5G1.3(c) and 
 Application Note 3 by considering the 22 months served as 
 
part of the federal sentence, which we consider distinct 
 
from credit under section 3585(b), we conclude that the 
 
BOP's position is incorrect. See United States v. Drake, 49 
 
F.3d 1438, 1440 (9th Cir. 1995) ("As the Court in Wilson 
 
explained, `[a]fter a District Court sentences a federal 
 
offender, the Attorney General, through the Bureau of 
 
Prisons, has the responsibility for administering the 
 
sentence.' . . . Such language presumes that the district 
 
court will first sentence the offender--applying the relevant 
 
Sentencing Guidelines--before credit determinations shall 
 
be made by the Bureau of Prisons.") (citation omitted). 
 
 
 
We hold that the BOP's failure to implement the sentence 
 
imposed by the sentencing court mandates habeas corpus 
 
relief under section 2241. See United States v. Williams, 
 
158 F.3d 736, 742 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding without merit 
 
federal defendant's motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S 2255 
 
based upon his belief that the BOP would not honor district 
 
court's sentencing order and stating that "in the unlikely 
 
circumstance that the [BOP] does not honor the district 
 
court's intention, [petitioner] will be free to seek relief under 
 
28 U.S.C. S 2241"); see also Gomori v. Arnold, 533 F.2d 
 
871, 874-75 (3d Cir. 1976) (holding that where prisoner 
 
seeking federal habeas corpus relief challenges effect of 
 
events "subsequent" to his sentence, habeas corpus remedy 
 
is appropriate rather than motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
 S 2255). Although our analysis of the legal issues the 
 
petition has raised differs from that of the district court, we 
 
ultimately agree with its original conclusion in Rios I that 
 
allowing the 22-month adjustment effectuates the intent of 
 
the sentencing court. Thus, we will affirm the district 
 
court's order granting the petition and its direction to the 
 
BOP to credit Rios with the 22 months he spent in 
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detention prior to the imposition of sentence on his federal 
 
convictions. 
 
 
 
B. 
 
 
 
Notwithstanding our affirmance of the district court's 
 
orders granting Rios habeas corpus relief, inasmuch as it 
 
appears that the district court's application of section 
 
3585(b) raises an issue of first impression in this circuit, we 
 
will address its interpretation of that provision. In both of 
 
its opinions, the district court essentially carved an 
 
exception to the plain language of section 3585(b) so as to 
 
award Rios a 22-month credit against his federal sentence, 
 
so that his sentence was, in effect 68 months. In its original 
 
memorandum and order, the district court relied on the 
 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's decision in Benefield 
 as espousing the correct approach in determining if pre- 
 
sentence credit under section 3585(b) is warranted even in 
 
circumstances indicating that credit already had been 
 
awarded against another sentence. See Rios I, 29 F. 
 
Supp.2d at 235 (citing Benefield, 942 F.2d at 66-67). In its 
 
second memorandum and order, it retreated from its 
 
reliance on Benefield, explaining that it had been under the 
 
impression originally that Rios's state and federal offenses 
 
were related such that there was a basis for the application 
 
of U.S.S.G. S 5G1.3(b). See Rios II, 34 F. Supp.2d at 269.12 
 
But because the district court on reconsideration 
 
recognized that the sentencing court did not apply section 
 
5G1.3(b) or its concept in awarding concurrent sentences 
 
with "credit for time served," the district court found that 
 
the reasoning in Benefield did not apply. See id. 
 
 
 
The district court nonetheless found that under the 
 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Brown 
 
II, the length of Rios's pre-sentence custody required a 
 
departure from the general rule prohibiting credit on a 
 
federal sentence for time spent serving a state sentence. 
 
See id. at 269-70 (citing Brown II, 28 F.3d at 1075). In this 
 
appeal, the BOP argues that the district court's analysis of 
 
the crediting issue was incorrect in both opinions, and it 
 
contends specifically that the general rule prohibiting 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 12. Rios asserts that they were related. See note 2, supra. 
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double credit should apply in this case. Accordingly, in its 
 
view the 22-month time period at issue should not be 
 
credited against Rios's federal sentence under section 
 
3585(b). 
 
 
 
The BOP's position is premised on the plain language of 
 
the last clause of section 3585(b). As we previously 
 
mentioned, section 3585(b) (emphasis added) provides: 
 
 
 
(b) Credit for prior custody.--A defendant shall be given 
 
credit toward the service of a term of imprisonment for 
 
any time spent in official detention prior to the date the 
 
sentence commences-- 
 
 
 
(1) as a result of the offense for which the sentence was 
 
imposed; or 
 
 
 
(2) as a result of any other charge for which the 
 
defendant was arrested after the commission of the 
 
offense for which the sentence was imposed; 
 
 
 
that has not been credited against another sentence. 
  
 
The courts have construed the last clause of section 
 
3585(b) as limiting an award of credit for time served prior 
 
to the imposition of a federal sentence under section 
 
3585(b) to instances where the time period was not spent in 
 
service of a previously imposed sentence and thus had not 
 
been credited against that earlier sentence. In other words, 
 
the majority of courts addressing this issue have 
 
determined that section 3585(b) generally prohibits an 
 
award of "double credit." See, e.g., Chambers v. Holland, 
 
920 F. Supp. 618, 623 (M.D. Pa.) ("The relief which 
 
petitioner seeks, i.e., to be given credit on his federal 
 
sentence for time served on [an ad prosequendum] writ 
 
issued by the federal court while he remained in the 
 
primary custody of the state, is inconsistent with federal 
 
law. Section 3585 does not permit credit on a federal 
 
sentence for time served and credited against another 
 
sentence."), aff 'd, 100 F.3d 946 (3d Cir. 1996) (table); see 
 
also United States v. Labeille-Soto, 163 F.3d 93, 99 (2d Cir. 
 
1998) (noting that a defendant has no right to credit on his 
 
federal sentence for time that has been credited against his 
 
prior state sentence); United States v. Kramer, 12 F.3d 130, 
 
132 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the BOP "properly decided 
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 not to award [the petitioner] credit for the time served, as 
 
it would have contravened the proscription in 18 U.S.C. 
 
S 3585(b) against double crediting"; court explained that 
 
"[t]he record shows that [the petitioner] received credit 
 
toward his state sentence for that same time period"); 
 
United States v. Dennis, 926 F.2d 768, 769 (8th Cir. 1991) 
 
(reaching same conclusion); Arashi v. United States, No. 94- 
 
7603, 1995 WL 453308, at *10 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. July 31, 1995) 
 
(noting that section 3585(b), the successor statute to 
 
section 3568, states explicitly that an individual can receive 
 
jail time credit only for time spent in custody"that has not 
 
been credited against another sentence"); cf. Wilson, 503 
 
U.S. at 337, 112 S.Ct. at 1355-56 (explaining that with the 
 
enactment of section 3585(b) in place of section 3568, 
 
"Congress made it clear that a defendant could not receive 
 
a double credit for his detention time."). 
 
 
 
We agree with this body of case law interpreting the plain 
 
language of section 3585(b), and find that in the 
 
circumstances presented here, the section does not 
 
authorize the award of credit for the 22 months that Rios 
 
spent in federal control under the second writ. 13 It is 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
13. Although the issue is not squarely before us, we recognize that the 
 
BOP permits the award of what amounts to a form of"double credit" in 
 
certain limited circumstances despite the plain language of section 
 3585(b). The BOP does not contest this point on appeal. Indeed, 
 
throughout the adjudication of Rios's administrative appeals of the BOP's 
 
denial of credit, the BOP referred to the possibility of an award of 
 
"double credit" pursuant to the "Willis/Kayfez line of cases." App. at 62, 
 
68. These statements refer to Willis v. United States, 438 F.2d 923 (5th 
 
Cir. 1971), and Kayfez v. Gaselle, 993 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 
 
 
To the extent that the district court relied on the fact that the BOP 
 
permits a credit under Willis and Kayfez which seemingly conflicts with 
 
the plain language of section 3585(b), we believe that it read too much 
 
into those opinions. Both Willis and Kayfez involved different crediting 
 
issues not presented on the facts of this case, as the 22-month time 
 
period at issue here occurred after the state sentence was imposed but 
 
before the federal sentence was pronounced. See U.S. Dept. of Justice, 
 
Fed. Bureau of Prisons Program Statement 5880.28(c)(2)(c) & (d) (Feb. 
 
14, 1997) (providing formulas for calculation of Willis and Kayfez 
 
credits). Moreover, it is clear from the administrative appeals that 
 
occurred in this case that the BOP considered the possibility of 
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undisputed that the 22-month time period was credited 
 
against his state sentence, as Rios already had been 
 
sentenced on the state offense and thus was serving that 
 
sentence during the relevant time period. We therefore 
 
conclude that the district court applied section 3585(b) 
 incorrectly. 
 
 
 
Specifically, in its memorandum and order denying the 
 
BOP's motion for reconsideration, the district court held 
 
that a departure from the general rule prohibiting double 
 
credit was warranted because of the length of time that 
 
Rios was held in federal detention pursuant to the second 
 
writ. In reaching its conclusion, it relied on Brown II where 
 
the court reached a similar result under factually 
 
analogous circumstances. See Rios II, 34 F. Supp.2d at 
 
269-70 (citing Brown II, 28 F.3d at 1075; Brown I, 21 F.3d 
 
at 1008-09). 
 
 
 
The defendant in Brown sought a credit against his 
 
federal sentence for time spent in a federal prison pursuant 
 
to writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum while awaiting 
 
trial and sentence on a federal narcotics charge. See Brown 
 
I, 21 F.3d at 1008. Prior to his arrest on the federal 
 
charges, a state court sentenced the defendant on a 
 
narcotics conviction. The defendant eventually was 
 
convicted of the federal offense. At the defendant's 
 
sentencing on the federal charge, the district court awarded 
 
jail time credit for all of the time spent in federal control 
 
pursuant to the writ. At some later point the credit was 
 
redacted, leading the defendant to file a habeas corpus 
 
petition in the district court. The court of appeals stated 
 
that the dispositive issue was whether the defendant was 
 entitled to credit on his federal sentence for the time spent 
 
in federal detention pursuant to the writ of habeas corpus 
 
ad prosequendum. See id. at 1009. 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
additional credit under the Willis/Kayfez line of cases, but rejected it. 
 
Thus, nothing in this opinion should be construed as suggesting that in 
 
other cases, the BOP's award of Willis and/or Kayfez credits is improper. 
 
The BOP's position with respect to the grant of Willis and Kayfez credits 
 
simply has no application to the facts of this case, and does not affect 
 
our conclusion that the award of double credit in Rios's case is 
 
prohibited by section 3585(b). 
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In the original panel opinion in Brown I and in its 
 
supplemental opinion in Brown II, the Court of Appeals for 
 
the Tenth Circuit held that the defendant was entitled to 
 
credit on his federal sentence for the time he was detained 
 
pursuant to the writ, which was approximately 19 months. 
 
The supplemental opinion recognized that pursuant to the 
 
writ, the defendant was in effect "on loan" to the federal 
 
authorities. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the 
 
"loan" effectuated by the writ at some point"transmuted" 
 
into federal "custody" for purposes of section 3568 such 
 
that credit against the federal sentence should have been 
 given to the defendant. See Brown II, 28 F.3d at 1075. The 
 
court stated that the defendant's case was unique because 
 
of the duration of the federal detention. See id. While 
 
declining to adopt a per se rule as to how long a state 
 
prisoner may be on loan to federal authorities without 
 
taking custody of the prisoner, the court found that the 19- 
 
month detention constituted federal custody under the 
 
plain language of section 3568, the predecessor statute to 
 
section 3585(b). See id. 
 
 
 
While the district court stated that the rule enunciated in 
 
Brown II was persuasive and thus applied it in this case, 
 
we find its reliance on Brown II misplaced. First, as the 
 
district court correctly pointed out (but did notfind 
 
dispositive), Brown was decided under section 3585(b)'s 
 
predecessor statute, section 3568. Section 3568 did not 
 
contain the explicit prohibition on double credit found in 
 
section 3585(b). See Wilson, 503 U.S. at 337, 112 S.Ct. at 
 
1355-56 (stating that Congress made clear in section 
 
3585(b) that a defendant could not receive double credit for 
 
his detention time). While the district court noted the 
 
difference in statutory language, it reasoned that the 
 
change was a "mere" codification of prior case law under 
 
section 3568 and therefore immaterial. See Rios II, 34 F. 
 
Supp.2d at 270-71. 
 
 
 
We do not share the district court's view that the change 
 in language is immaterial. Assuming that the district court 
 
is correct in its supposition that Congress added the last 
 
clause of section 3585(b) to codify then-existing case law 
 
interpreting section 3568, it does not follow that we may 
 
ignore the plain language in section 3585(b) to achieve 
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what may be perceived as an equitable result.14 Because the 
 
court in Brown obviously did not address the plain 
 
language of the last clause of section 3585(b), we believe 
 
that the district court erred in relying on the rule of law 
 
announced in that case. See Brown I, 21 F.3d at 1010 ("The 
 
fact that the state continued to grant Appellant jail time 
 
credit does not impact on our analysis under the facts 
 
presented herein because Appellant clearly satisfied the 
 
requirements of S 3568."). 
 
 
 
More fundamentally, however, we respectfully disagree 
 
with the reasoning employed by the court in Brown. We 
 
understand the court's conclusion that the prolonged 
 
detention transmuted into federal custody as an attempt to 
 
fit the case within the plain language of section 3568. 
 
Indeed, the court's reference to the federal detention as 
 
being transmuted into custody for purposes of the crediting 
 
statute tracks the pertinent language of section 3568.15 
 Nevertheless, as the BOP correctly argues, the law on this 
 
point is clear: a prisoner detained pursuant to a writ of 
 
habeas corpus ad prosequendum remains in the primary 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
14. Our research reveals that the majority of the courts addressing the 
 
meaning of section 3568 interpreted that statute to prohibit the award 
 
of "double credit" despite the fact that the language of the statute did 
not 
 
explicitly limit its application in that manner. See, e.g. Sinito v. 
Kindt, 
 
954 F.2d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that several cases held under 
 
section 3568 that a prisoner in state custody subject to a writ of habeas 
 
corpus ad prosequendum based on a federal charge is not entitled to 
 
pretrial credit against his subsequent federal sentence because the time 
 
spent in pretrial custody was credited toward his existing state sentence) 
 
(citing cases); Siegel v. United States, 436 F.2d 92, 95 (2d Cir. 1970) 
 
(finding that defendant was not entitled to double credit for time spent 
 
in federal control prior to the imposition of the federal sentence where 
it 
 
was undisputed that he was serving a state sentence during the relevant 
 
time period and the time was credited to his state sentence). 
 
 
 
15. Section 3568, which was repealed in 1984, provided in relevant part 
 
(emphasis added): 
 
 
 
The sentence of imprisonment of any person convicted of an offense 
 
shall commence to run from the date on which such person is 
 
received at the penitentiary, reformatory, or jail for service of such 
 
sentence. The Attorney General shall give any such person credit 
 
toward service of his sentence for any days spent in custody in 
 
connection with the offense or acts for which sentence was imposed. 
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custody of the first jurisdiction unless and until the first 
 
sovereign relinquishes jurisdiction over the prisoner. See, 
 
e.g., Jake v. Herschberger, 173 F.3d 1059, 1061 n.1 (7th 
 
Cir. 1999); Chambers, 920 F. Supp. at 622; United States v. 
 
Smith, 812 F. Supp. 368, 371-72 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). 
 
 
 
We are not aware of any principle of law which supports 
 
the conclusion that the length of time in federal detention 
 
effectively abrogates the doctrine of primary jurisdiction -- 
 
predicated on principles of comity -- and "transmutes" the 
 
inmate into a federal prisoner for crediting purposes under 
 
section 3585(b) or its predecessor statute, section 3568. 
 
Moreover, we are unable to ascertain the point at which the 
 
prisoner would be deemed to have become a federal 
 
prisoner for credit purposes. In this regard, we point out 
 
that it is ironical that the longer the federal pretrial 
 
detention lasted, the better off the prisoner would be from 
 
a crediting standpoint, because a short detention might not 
 
result in the prisoner's being regarded as being in federal 
 
custody at all, in which case he would not be entitled to 
 
credit for that period against the federal sentence ultimately 
 
imposed. 
 
 
 
Thus, we agree with those courts which have determined 
 
that the general rule prohibiting double credit articulated in 
 
section 3585(b) applies equally to situations where, as here, 
 
the prisoner was in federal control pursuant to a writ of 
 
habeas corpus ad prosequendum during the time period for 
 
which a pre-sentence credit is sought. See Chambers, 920 
 
F. Supp. at 622-23 (finding that petitioner could not receive 
 
credit on federal sentence for time period commencing 
 
March 9, 1992, to October 16, 1992, the date the federal 
 
sentence was imposed; court noted that petitioner was 
 
serving state sentence as of March 9, 1992, and was 
 
subject to primary jurisdiction of state during relevant time 
 
period); see also Miller v. Crabtree, No. 98-989, 1999 WL 
 
607191, at *2 (D. Or. Aug. 4, 1999) (rejecting petitioner's 
 
request for credit for pre-sentence incarceration where 
 
petitioner received credit for time served on sentence for 
 
state parole violation); United States v. Mahmood, 19 F. 
 
Supp.2d 33, 35 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying petitioner credit 
 
under section 3585(b) not awarded by BOP for entire pre- 
 
sentence time period and noting that BOP "erred on the 
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side of generosity" in awarding some credit toward federal 
 
sentence for time spent in detention pursuant to a federal 
 
writ of habeas corpus as prosequendum; court noted that 
 
time spent in custody pursuant to writ already had been 
 
credited against state sentence); Smith, 812 F. Supp. at 374 
 
(recognizing that section 3585(b) prohibits "double credit"); 
 
cf. Sinito v. Kindt, 954 F.2d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 1993) (and 
 
cases cited therein) (rejecting petitioner's request for credit 
 
on second federal sentence for pre-sentence incarceration 
 
pursuant to section 3568; court stated that petitioner's 
 
request was "absurd," as it was clear that petitioner was 
 
serving a prior federal sentence during the detention 
 
period); Arashi, 1995 WL 453308, at *4-9 (reaching same 
 
conclusion under similar facts). 
 
 
 
The principal rationale for disallowing double credit in 
 
this circumstance is that the prisoner is not in custody 
 
solely because of the pending federal charges, but instead 
 
is serving the prior state sentence. See Sinito, 954 F.2d at 
 
469; Miller, 1999 WL 607191, at *2; see also Chambers, 
 
920 F. Supp. at 622-23. Thus, in harmony with the 
 
principles of primary custodial jurisdiction and comity, the 
 
prisoner remains in service of the first sentence imposed 
 
during the time period, and the writ merely "loans" the 
 
prisoner to federal authorities. See id. at 622 (stating that 
 
producing a state prisoner under a writ of habeas corpus 
 
ad prosequendum to answer to federal charges does not 
 
relinquish state custody); Smith, 812 F. Supp. at 371, 374 
 
(same) (citing cases). 
 
 
 
Applying these principles to the circumstances of Rios's 
 
detention on the federal writ, it is clear that he remained 
 
throughout the 22-month time period in the primary 
 
custodial jurisdiction of the State of New York, and that as 
 
a result, he received credit against his state sentence for 
 
the entire 22 months. Indeed, it would appear that the 
 
situation presented in this case is the quintessential 
 
example of when section 3585(b)'s prohibition of double 
 
credit should apply. Moreover, this position is consistent 
 
with the BOP's Program Statement interpreting section 
 
3585(b) which is entitled to deference.16 See Dept. of 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
16. A Program Statement is an internal agency guideline, which is akin 
 
to an interpretive rule. See Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61, 115 S.Ct. 
 
2021, 2027 (1995). Where the BOP's interpretation of section 3585(b) is 
 
a "permissible construction of the statute," it is entitled to "some 
 
deference." Id., 115 S.Ct. at 2027. 
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Justice, Bureau of Prisons' Program Statement No. 
 
5880.28(c)(1)(a)(2) (Feb. 14, 1997) ("Credit will not be given 
 
for any portion of [pre-federal sentence] time spent serving 
 
another sentence regardless of whether the sentence is 
 
federal, state or foreign."); id. at No. 5880.28(c)(6) (July 29, 
 
1994) ("Time spent in custody under a writ of habeas 
 
corpus from non-federal custody will not in and of itself be 
 
considered for the purpose of crediting pre-sentence time. 
 
The primary reason for `writ' custody is not the federal 
 
charge." The federal court merely `borrows' the prisoner 
 
under the provisions of the writ for secondary custody."). 
 
 
 
As we have indicated, in addition to its reliance on Brown 
 
II, the district court originally premised its result on the 
 
opinion in Benefield, but then retreated from its position in 
 
deciding the BOP's reconsideration motion. On 
 
reconsideration, the district court read the outcome in 
 
Benefield as grounded on the fact that the federal charges 
 
arose out of the same conduct as the state conviction, and 
 
determined that the state and federal charges in this case 
 
were not based on the same conduct. It reached its 
 
conclusion in this connection apparently because the 
 
record submitted on reconsideration demonstrated that the 
 
sentencing court did not apply U.S.S.G. S 5G1.3(b) at 
 
sentencing. See Rios II, 34 F. Supp.2d at 269. 
 
 
 
Rios argues in his brief that the holding in Benefield 
 
provides an alternative basis for affirming the district 
 
court's grant of habeas corpus relief. We, however, disagree 
 
with Rios to the extent that he contends that Benefield 
 
compels the conclusion that he is entitled to a 22-month 
 
credit against his federal sentence under section 3585(b). 
 
 
 
To be sure, the court of appeals in Benefield permitted an 
 
award of pre-sentence credit on a federal sentence for time 
 
credited toward service of the state sentence. Nevertheless, 
 
we cannot determine from the opinion which period of 
 
incarceration was at issue, i.e., whether the defendant 
 
served the time prior to the imposition of the state 
 
sentence, after the imposition of the state sentence but 
 
prior to the commencement of the federal sentence, or both. 
 
See Benefield, 942 F.2d at 66-67 (noting that defendant 
 
sought credit for "time served prior to sentencing"); see also 
 
Major Michael G. Seidel, Giving Service Members the Credit 
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They Deserve: A Review of Sentencing Credit and Its 
 
Application, Army Law., (Aug. 1999), available in Westlaw, 
 
1999-AUG ARMLAW, at *7, *12 (indicating that Benefield 
 
interpreted section 3585 to require federal credit for state 
 
pretrial confinement). As we have explained in note 13, the 
 
BOP permits an award of pre-sentence credit under section 
 
3585(b) in certain circumstances even where the same 
 
period of detention was credited against a prior sentence. 
 
Inasmuch as the basis for the court's holding in Benefield 
 
is unclear, we do not believe that its outcome controls on 
 
the facts of this case as it is undisputed that Rios spent the 
 
entire 22 months in service of a previously imposed state 
 
sentence and thus received credit against that state 
 
sentence. In any event, to the extent that Benefield may be 
 
inconsistent with our result, we will not follow it. 
 
 
 
In our view, the construction of the last phrase of section 
 
3585(b) and its application to the facts of this case is 
 
relatively straightforward. If the sentencing court had not 
 
applied section 5G1.3(c) and Application Note 3 in 
 
pronouncing Rios's sentence such that the issue presented 
 
on appeal was in fact a crediting matter governed by 
 
section 3585(b), under that statute Rios would not be 
 
entitled to the 22-month credit for the time spent in federal 
 
control pursuant to the writ. Indeed, the district court 
 
recognized that section 3585(b) generally prohibits an 
 
award of double credit. Rios II, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 270 
 
("Unlike in Brown, where section 3568 did not prohibit 
 
double credit, section 3585(b) does, and since Rios received 
 
credit for the 22-month period on his New York state 
 
sentence, it could be argued that section 3585(b) prohibits 
 
credit here."). 
 
 
 
For each of these reasons, we find that the district court 
 
interpreted section 3585(b) incorrectly so as to permit the 
 
court to require the BOP to award Rios double credit for the 
 
22-month time period at issue. We thus expressly reject the 
 
alternative rule enunciated by Brown II and followed by the 
 
district court in this case. Nevertheless, despite the district 
 
court's error in this regard, we will affirm on the alternative 
 
ground that the sentencing court applied section 5G1.3(c) 
 
and Application Note 3 in sentencing Rios such that the 
 
BOP is required to calculate his federal sentence in the 
 
manner he requested in his petition. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order 
 
granting Rios's petition for a writ of habeas corpus entered 
 
December 8, 1998, and the order denying reconsideration 
 
entered on February 3, 1999. 
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